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BOOK REVIEW
WHEN THE LAWYERS SLEPT: THE UNMAKING OF THE
BROOKLYN DODGERS

Robert M. Jarvist
I
INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, the movement of franchises from one city
to another has become a regular part of professional sports;' in recent years, relocations have reached unprecedented levels.2 Yet det Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University; B.A., Northwestern University;J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., New York University.
I The first modern professional sports team relocation probably occurred in 1903,
when the National League Baltimore Orioles moved to the American League and became the New York Highlanders. The atrocious Highlanders eventually renamed themselves the Yankees, acquired Babe Ruth from the Boston Red Sox, and went on to
become one of the most famous teams in professional sports history. After this shift
only a handful of relocations occurred before World War II, mostly in the National Football League. Beginning in 1950, however, franchise shifts became increasingly popular,
and nearly seventy took place during the next thirty years. Johnson, MunicipalAdministration and the Sports FranchiseRelocation Issue, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 519, 520 (1983).
2 During the last decade, numerous sports teams have relocated. In the National
Basketball Association, poor attendance forced the New Orleans Jazz to become the
UtahJazz, the New York Nets to move to NewJersey, the Kansas City Kings to switch to
Sacramento, and the San Diego Clippers to regroup in Los Angeles. In the National
Football League, more attractive stadiums lured the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles,
the Baltimore Colts to Indianapolis, the St. Louis Cardinals to Phoenix, and the New
York Giants and New YorkJets to NewJersey. In the National Hockey League, a combination of problems led the Atlanta Flames to Calgary and the Colorado Rockies to New
Jersey, where they became the Devils. In addition to actual franchise shifts, there have
been a number of threatened shifts. In Major League Baseball, the Chicago Cubs
threatened to move to the suburbs if the city of Chicago refused to install lights in Wrigley Field. The Chicago White Sox held negotiations designed to bring them to a new
stadium in St. Petersburg, thereby escaping from their crumbling stadium on the rundown South Side of Chicago. The San Francisco Giants have considered a number of
new homes due to sagging attendance and the poor playing conditions at Candlestick
Park. Meanwhile, the Cleveland Indians, Pittsburgh Pirates, and Seattle Mariners have
all at one time or another suggested that they might move. In the National Football
League, the Houston Oilers looked into moving to Jacksonville prior to deciding to stay
in the Astrodome. The New Orleans Saints considered leaving Louisiana until the state
granted millions of dollars of tax concessions. In the National Hockey League, the St.
Louis Blues came very close to relocating to Saskatoon; only last minute intervention by
league officials kept the team in St. Louis.
The current rash of attempted and successful relocations has produced a strong
backlash among both fans and owners, the introduction of anti-relocation legislation in
Congress, and a number of lawsuits. The wealth of literature which has grown up
around the subject reviews these matters at length. See, e.g., Eisen, FranchiseRelocation in
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spite dozens of shifts and threatened shifts, no relocation has
generated the level of passion, study, and controversy as the decision of the Brooklyn Dodgers to move to Los Angeles after the 1957
season. For many older Brooklynites, even those who have since
moved away from the borough, the loss of the Dodgers is still a sta3
ple of conversation.
Over the years, conventional wisdom has taught that the Dodgers moved to Los Angeles because of the greed of their owner, Walter O'Malley, who was dissatisfied with the team's revenues in
Brooklyn and saw a chance to make greater profits on the West
Coast. As a result, O'Malley's status as a traitor to the people of
Brooklyn has become legendary. 4 But in a new work entitled The
Dodgers Move West, 5 Neil J. Sullivan has gone back in time in an attempt to ferret out the truth about O'Malley's decision to move the
Dodgers. The results of his painstaking research 6 are startling.
According to Professor Sullivan, O'Malley initially opposed
moving the Dodgers to Los Angeles, and eventually did so only with
great reluctance. In Professor Sullivan's view, O'Malley would have
kept the Dodgers in Brooklyn if he could have built a new stadium
7
to replace the aging Ebbets Field.
The author believes that the Dodgers ultimately moved to Los
Angeles because O'Malley lacked sufficient funds to buy the land
Major League Baseball,4 Err. & Sp. L.J. 19 (1987); Glick, ProfessionalSports FranchiseMovements and the Sherman Act: When and Where Teams Should be Able to Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 55 (1983); Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of FranchiseRelocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157 (1984); Quirk, An EconomicAnalysis of Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS" 42 (1973); Roberts, The Single
Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL.
L. REV. 562 (1986); Shropshire, OpportunisticSports Franchise Relocations: Can Punitive Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract Strike a Balance?, 22 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 569 (1989); Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation in the
Sports Industry, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1013; Comment, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 1329 (1986); Note, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act: Congress' Best
Response to Raiders?, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 345 (1987).
3 For a time, Brooklynites talked of bringing the Dodgers back to Brooklyn. Still
later, some Dodger fans came to accept the New York Mets, a National League expansion team, as their team. Today, talk focuses on establishing a minor league team on
Coney Island and naming it the Brooklyn Dodgers. Rangel, State ProposesBaseball Stadium
for Coney L, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
4
See, e.g., P. GOLENBOCK, BUMS-ORAL HISTORY OF THE BROOKLYN DODGERS
(1984); R. KAHN, THE Boys OF SUMMER (1971); D. RICE, SEASONS PAST (1976).
5 N. SULLIVAN, THE DODGERS MOVE WEST (1987).
6 Although Walter O'Malley had died by the time the book was begun, Professor
Sullivan was able to speak at length with O'Malley's son, Peter, who took over the club
from his father. Id. at xi, 192. In addition, Professor Sullivan spoke with a number of
Walter O'Malley's contemporaries, including Vin Scully, the team's long-time announcer; former New York City Mayor Robert Wagner; former Los Angeles
Councilwoman Rosalind Wyman; and Congressman Edward Roybal. Id. at xi.
7 Id. at ix.
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needed for the stadium. When O'Malley turned to New York City
for help in acquiring the land through eminent domain proceedings,
master builder Robert Moses, who was at the height of his power,
rebuffed him. With no hope of building a new stadium in Brooklyn,
and opposed to the idea of accepting a stadium built with public
funds, O'Malley had no choice but to leave for Los Angeles, where
the city fathers were willing to provide him with a large tract of land
known as Chavez Ravine.8
II
THE BIRTH OF THE BROOKLYN DODGERS AND THE
BUILDING OF EBBETS FIELD

Professional baseball first came to Brooklyn in 1884, when the
American Association admitted a team from Brooklyn. 9 Then just
three years old, the American Association was attempting to compete with the more powerful National League which had been
formed as the nation's first professional baseball league in 1876.
The new Brooklyn team, known as the Trolley Dodgers, prospered,
and in 1889 became the champions of the American Association.' 0
In the next year, the team switched leagues, joining the National
League as the Brooklyn Bridegrooms. I I
In 1898, Charles Ebbets assumed the presidency of the Bridegrooms. 12 During the next few years the Bridegrooms, subsequently known as the Superbas, enjoyed great success, but after
13
1902 many of their star players retired and the team foundered.
After nearly ten years of futility, however, Ebbets began to rebuild
the team both on and off the field. He hired Wilbert Robinson away
from the cross-town rival Giants and began cultivating a battery of
future star players. 14 More importantly, he began construction of a
new stadium.
The plan to build a new stadium in Brooklyn first began to take
shape in 1908.15 After much searching, he selected a desolate part
of the borough known at various times as Pigtown, Goatville, Tin
Can Alley and Crow Hill. 16 The decision to build a new stadium in
so bleak a place was a masterful piece of planning, for Pigtown had
plenty of empty land which could support a new stadium.
8

Id. at viii.

9
10

Id. at5.
Id.

I1

Id.

12
14

Id. at6.
Id.
Idtat 7.

15

Id. at 56.

16

Id at4.

13
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During the next three years, Ebbets busied himself with the task
of acquiring the parcels for his new stadium. This proved much
harder to do than expected, for forty different owners held the land
which Ebbets needed.' 7 In order to disguise his true purpose and
thereby avoid a ruinous jump in land prices, Ebbets formed a
dummy corporation to buy the needed parcels.' 8 Although the entire task was not completed until the end of 1911, Ebbets managed
to keep the news of what he was doing away from much of the public
and the press. 19 As a result, the purchases, although time-consuming, went smoothly and without substantial price gouging.
With the land now in hand, Ebbets set about to build his stadium. Within a year, and after the expenditure of $750,000 (at the
time a remarkable sum of money), the stadium was ready. 20 When
Ebbets Field opened on April 4, 1913, sports writers and fans her21
alded it as a magnificent stadium.
III
THE NEED

FOR A

NEW STADIUM

During the next four decades, Ebbets Field served as the faithful home of the team now called the Brooklyn Dodgers. Dodger
fans affectionately nicknamed their team the Bums, and in 1955 the
Dodgers beat the New York Yankees to win their only World Series. 22 But neither the success of the team nor the faithfulness of its
fans could conceal the fact that. time had taken its toll on the
23
stadium.
By now, the team was under the control of Walter O'Malley, a
hard-nosed businessman. 24 He realized that the stadium's small
size, cramped conditions, and inhospitable surroundings made a
25
new stadium imperative if the team were to continue its success.
17
18
19

Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.

20

Id. at 4.

21

Id.

Id. at 7-17, 58-67.
Id. at 38-41.
24
Id. at 29-32. O'Malley also was a lawyer. After graduating from the University of
Pennsylvania, O'Malley obtained a law degree from Fordham Law School and then
opened a corporate practice in Manhattan. Id. at 29. In 1941, the Dodgers appointed
him club attorney. In 1944, O'Malley, together with Branch Rickey and John Smith,
purchased a 75% interest in the club. Id. After years of bickering, O'Malley bought out
Rickey in 1950 for the then astronomical sum of $1,050,000 and thereby secured total
ownership of the Dodgers. Id. at 30.
25 Id. at 38-44. When Ebbets decided to build his stadium in Pigtown, the area was
virtually uninhabited. In the years which followed, however, urban development converted Pigtown into Crown Heights, a fashionable neighborhood. Following World War
II, Crown Heights began to suffer from urban blight and the flight of its middle class
22

23
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Thus, O'Malley began the search for a suitable new home.
Because by this time others had developed the land around Ebbets Field to its full capacity, O'Malley rejected renovating Ebbets
Field. 26 Instead, his attention turned to a plot of land at the Brooklyn terminal of the Long Island Rail Road at the corner of Atlantic
and Flatbush Avenues, about a mile from Ebbets Field. The new
site was accessible to fans via the Long Island Rail Road and two
27
subway lines.
O'Malley liked the idea of building a new stadium at this new
location and already had the necessary money. What he lacked was
easy access to the land.28 Recalling the difficulties that Ebbets encountered in acquiring land in Pigtown, O'Malley concluded that
only the government, exercising its eminent domain powers, 29
could in a single stroke collect the necessary parcels of land and sell
them to the Dodgers at a price that made economic sense.30
inhabitants. By the 1950's, Crown Heights had become "an uninviting place in an increasingly unfamiliar neighborhood, and many former Brooklyn residents stopped attending games." Id. at 39.
26 Id- at 41. Whether O'Malley ever considered seriously the idea of refurbishing
Ebbets Field is an open question. As Professor Sullivan notes, "[p]erhaps O'Malley
thought a serious upgrading of Ebbets Field would preclude the support he needed for a
new stadium." Id. at 41. Professor Sullivan, however, is convinced that a new stadium
was a necessity. In 1938, Larry MacPhail, then president of the Brooklyn Dodgers, renovated Ebbets Field at a cost of $100,000. "The stadium was repainted, given new seats,
renovated dugouts and clubhouses, and the field was groomed to eliminate rocks and
divots that had plagued infielders for years." Id. at 11. A similar renovation, according
to Professor Sullivan, would not work in the 1950's. Although other parks built at the
same time as Ebbets Field, including Comiskey Park, Wrigley Field, Fenway Park, and
Tiger Stadium, remain in use, see Berkow, Baseball's Palacesof the Mind, N.Y. Times, July
11, 1988, at 35, col. 1, Ebbets Field was, in Professor Sullivan's opinion, "beyond repair." N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 41. "By the 1950s .... the old preserve had become
obsolete. The most compelling evidence of that obsolescence is the fact that despite its
small size and the perpetual drama of the pennant races of those years the park was
hardly ever filled to capacity." Id. at 40.
27 Id. at 44, 54.
28 Id. at 44 ("[w]hat O'Malley needed from New York City officials was not money
for the stadium but access to the site."). While O'Malley was willing to pay for the land,
he needed "help from the city to acquire the necessary land at a reasonable price." Id. at
54.
29 Eminent domain, of course, is the power of the state to acquire private land without first obtaining the owner's consent. In the United States, two checks on this power
exist. First, the government may not take property except for a public purpose or use.
Second, the owner must receive reasonable compensation. See generally J. SACKMAN,
NIcHOLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (rev. 3d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1988).
30 N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 55-57:
The chances that in the 1950s Walter O'Malley could have formed a secret corporation and purchased land for a new stadium without the media
and then the public finding out are too remote to be entertained seriously. Such a scenario would have brought a real estate boom to the
Atlantic-Flatbush area.
Id. at 56.
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On August 10, 1955 O'Malley wrote to the city to request that it
condemn specific parcels under a postwar law known as the Housing
Act of 1949.3' Title I of the law encouraged local governments to
clear slums and reverse urban blight by providing them federal
funds to help finance such projects.3 2 In order for the private sector
to be eligible for federal funding for participating in the renewal,
the projects had to have a "public purpose." 3 3 Accordingly,
O'Malley proposed that in addition to building a new stadium for
the Dodgers, he would have the area around Atlantic and Flatbush
Avenues cleaned up, a new meat market built, and the old Long
34
Island Rail Road terminal torn down and a new station erected.
O'Malley's proposal went to Robert Moses, the architect of
many of New York City's present highways, tunnels, bridges,
beaches, and parks and, at that time, the New York City administrator of Title 1.35 Within days, Moses rejected O'Malley's proposal
and wrote: "I can only repeat what we have told you verbally and in
writing, namely, that a new ball field for the Dodgers cannot be
36
dressed up as a Title I project."
IV
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF TITLE

I

AND THE CORPORATION

COUNSEL'S ALTERNATIVE PLAN

Robert Moses was wrong that New York City's condemnation
and subsequent sale of land to the Dodgers would not fit within the
strictures of Title I; moreover, he knew he was wrong. 37 Moses opposed building a new stadium at Atlantic and Flatbush Avenues be31
Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 42
U.S.C.). President Truman pushed through the Act on July 15, 1949 as part of his "Fair
Deal" legislation. The Act's goal was to stimulate residential housing construction in
order to alleviate the post-war shortage of affordable housing for lower and middleincome families. In order to accomplish this goal, the Act provided federal assistance
for local public housing, slum clearance, and farm housing projects. The Act's passage
and purposes are discussed at length in Robinson & Robinson, A New Era in Public Housing, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 695, and in Comment, The HousingAct of 1949-A FederalProgram
for Public Housing and Slum Clearance, 44 ILL. L. REV. 685 (1949). For a discussion of the
Act's role in national housing policy in the forty years since its passage, see McDougall,
Affordable Housingfor the 1990's, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 727 (1987).
32 Ch. 338, §§ 101-10, 63 Stat. 413, 414-21. Title I officially was entitled, "Slum
Clearance and Community Development and Redevelopment."
33
N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 47-48.
34 Id. at 48.
35 Id. at 49-51. Moses' life is the subject of a now famous biography. See R. CARO,
THE POWER BROKER (1975).
36
N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 48.
37 As Professor Sullivan states, "[w]hen Moses told Walter O'Malley that Title I of
the Federal Housing Act would not permit the use of land for the construction of a
baseball stadium, what he meant was that he did not wish the land used in that way." Id.
at 50.
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cause it conflicted with his plans to see New York City emerge as a
modem metropolis connected by an intricate series of highways
built around numerous public parks and beaches. 3 8 As a result,
Moses instead suggested that New York build a new publicly financed and publicly owned stadium as part of a grand plan to develop Flushing Meadows. 3 9 O'Malley refused the offer of a public
40
stadium.
From 1955 through 1957, Moses and O'Malley remained
locked in constant battle, with Moses continuing to argue, in the
face of numerous proposals, that the legal constraints of Title I
made it impossible for the Dodgers to acquire the needed land
through city efforts. 4 1 No one challenged Moses' view, 4 2 despite extensive media coverage 4 3 and the existence of seemingly adequate
legal precedent. 44 Finally, New York City Corporation Counsel Pe38
Moses was against the Atlantic-Flatbush proposal for three additional reasons.
First, Moses was not overly concerned with Brooklyn. Second, Moses favored participatory recreation over spectatorship. Third, the renovation of the Atlantic-Flatbush
area would have meant an improvement in the Long Island Rail Road's Atlantic Avenue
depot. Any movement away from the automobile and towards mass transportation
threatened Moses' own power resulting from his control over the city's highways, tunnels, and bridges as the head of the Triborough Commission and numerous other public
authorities. Therefore, Moses needed to keep the Atlantic Avenue area in decay. Id at
50-51.
39 Id. at 110- 11. The idea of developing Flushing Meadows, a large and ugly expanse of land located in the geographic center of New York City, had long fired Moses'
imagination. Id. Moses' plan to develop Flushing Meadows on a grand scale eventually
did come to pass. In 1964-65, the World's Fair was held in Flushing Meadows. Id. at
S111.At the same time, the expansion New York Mets moved to the very site which
Moses had offered to O'Malley. Id. at 116. See further infra notes 46 and 52.
40
O'Malley said he did not "want to be a tenant in a political ball park," but rather
wanted to "own my own ball park and run it the way I think it should be run." Id at 127.
A strong argument can be made that O'Malley's refusal to accept a long-term lease in a
public stadium was a product of greed, stubbornness, or both. The last stadium built
with private funds had been Yankee Stadium in 1923. Id. at 44. In the meantime, the
Milwaukee Braves and Baltimore Orioles had both moved from private to public stadiums (in 1953 and 1954, respectively). Id. Moreover, public financing was about to become an accepted way of building professional sports arenas. See infra note 50.
Ultimately, even the New York Yankees joined the move to public funding. In the early
1
970's, over $100 million of public funds were used to finance the renovation of Yankee
Stadium. N. SULLIVAN, sipra note 5, at 213.
41
Id. at 51-57, 130-32.
42
Professor Sullivan does not account for why lawyers did not challenge Moses'
view, although he does point out that Moses was at the height of his power at this time
and beyond the control of normal political forces. Id. at 49. Professor Sullivan also does
not explain why O'Malley, himself a lawyer, did not seek to bring the issue to a judicial
resolution. While discussing another aspect of the move, however, Professor Sullivan
does suggest that O'Malley's legal foresight was less than may have been expected of a
successful executive. Id. at 138-39.
43
As Professor Sullivan points out, however, the media may have been biased
against O'Malley, and frequently reported his side of the story incorrectly. Id. at 115,
131-32.
44
Several years before O'Malley first asked New York City to help the Dodgers by
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ter Brown issued a legal opinion on September 11, 1957 offering a
invoking Title I, a law review article studied in great detail all legal challenges to public
slum clearance and low-recent housing projects. Hill, Recent Slum Clearance and Urban
Redevelopment Laws, 9 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 173 (1952). After noting that the overwhelming number of these challenges had failed, the author concluded that:
The unanimity of judicial decisions on these questions clearly establishes
the validity of this approach to the slum clearance problem. The exercise
of the power of eminent domain and the expenditure of public funds to
acquire and clear slum areas is proper as being for a public purpose and

use.
Id. at 185-86 (emphasis added). The article further stated that "[a]lthough the program
described in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 has not yet been similarly tested under
the Federal Constitution, there appears to be no distinction in principle, purpose or
approach as to warrant a different result." id. at 183.
Shortly after the appearance of Hill's article, but still before O'Malley sent his proposal to Moses, the United States Supreme Court decided Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954). In Berman, the Court adopted a broad definition of the phrase "public use" for
eminent domain proceedings. The Court stated that land could be given to private individuals. Because "[tihe concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive," id. at 33, Congress could condemn property on a whole-sale basis, whether for the purpose of
erecting schools and churches, or even "shopping centers." Id. at 35. The final definition of public use and welfare would rest with the legislature, not the courts. Id. at 3536. Thus, virtually any use which would bestow an advantage on the public would justify
a taking by the government.

Also prior to O'Malley's letter, Congress expanded the scope of its housing program by enlarging the reach of Title I. Under the amendments, individuals could now

apply slum prevention programs not only to deteriorating areas but also to areas in
danger of deterioration. Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, tit. III, § 311, 68
Stat. 590, 626, repealed by Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116, 88 Stat. 633, 652 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982)). The
impact of the amendments was immediate and significant. Just four years after the
amendments became law, Yale Law Professor Quintin Johnstone noted that:
Despite Congressional indications that improvement of housing is the
primary objective of the urban renewal program, many important
projects have as their primary purpose the revival of business districts
that have been declining due to suburban or outlying business competition. Project area improvements to fulfill this purpose are new store and
office buildings; hotels; markets; parking facilities; traffic patterns; and,
adjacent to the business districts, new high income apartments to add
retail sales volume.
Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 301, 321-22 (1958).
Despite these precedents, Professor Sullivan concludes (without explaining why)
that it was unclear whether adequate precedents existed in 1957 which would have allowed the Dodgers to invoke Title I. N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 120. Yet O'Malley's
Atlantic-Flatbush proposal had all the characteristics which Professor Johnstone described and which federal and local officials previously approved. As Professor Sullivan
explains, the site O'Malley wanted:
was part of a proposed redevelopment project, ...
[of which a] new stadium for the Dodgers was only one item proposed to the Board Estimate.
Also mentioned were the need for commercial and residential redevelopment of substandard and unsanitary dwellings, the problem of traffic congestion, a possible new terminal for the Long Island Rail Road, and
relocation of the Fort Greene Meat Market.
Id. at 54-55. O'Malley stressed these aspect of the project while testifying to the Antitrust Subcommittee of the HouseJudiciary Committee inJune 1957,just months before
he announced his decision to relocate to Los Angeles. Id. at 124.
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45
way around Moses' position.
Unfortunately, Brown's suggestion came too late. After years
of attempting to get New York City to assist him, O'Malley on October 8, 1957, announced that he had decided to move the Dodgers to
Los Angeles. 4 6 The Los Angeles city fathers had been working for
some time to put together an attractive package for O'Malley and in
the end had placed a large plot of land known as Chavez Ravine at
O'Malley's disposal. 4 7 Thus, in the winter of 1958, the Dodgers
moved to Los Angeles, and for the next four seasons played in the
oversized and ill-equipped Los Angeles Coliseum while construction proceeded on their new stadium. 48 On April 10, 1962, the
45
As reported by The New York Times, Brown believed that New York City could
acquire the necessary land and resell it to the Dodgers "if the city Planning Commission
determined that the area was substandard and unsanitary." Id. at 134. Doing so would
avoid Title I and circumvent Robert Moses' power as the Title I Administrator. Deputy
Mayor John Theobald eagerly announced that this proposal would be studied by the
New York City Board of Estimate at its forthcoming meeting on September 19, 1957. IkL
46
Id. at 3. The manner of O'Malley's announcement is worth recounting. As Professor Sullivan tells it:
[D]uring a World Series game between the Yankees and Braves, the
Dodgers announced they would move to Los Angeles for the 1958 season. The manner of the announcement showed little consideration for
the Brooklyn fans being left behind. A publicist for the Dodgers read the
...statement to those in the press room at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel....
Walter O'Malley was not in attendance for the announcement, nor was
Brooklyn invited to bid its team farewell.
Id. at 135-36.
O'Malley decided to leave New York just a few months after Horace Stoneham, the
owner of the New York Giants, decided to move to San Francisco due to saggingattendance at the ancient Polo Grounds. Id. at 133. Although many commentators argued that
Stoneham's decision absolutely was necessary if the team were to survive, Professor Sullivan suggests that this was not true. If the Giants had stayed in New York, they would
have had the lucrative New York broadcast market to themselves. Id. at 116. Moreover,
it is likely that Moses would have proposed a new stadium in Flushing Meadows for the
Giants, just as he had done for the Dodgers and would do for the New York Mets in the
early 1960's. Id. See further infra note 52. The Mets "have prospered [in Flushing Meadows], while the Giants, meanwhile, have battled to survive in San Francisco." Id. For a
history of the Giants in New York, see N. HYND, THE GIANTS OF THE POLO GROUNDS
(1988). The final chapter of Hynd's book recalls Stoneham's decision to move the Giants to San Francisco. Id. at 378-82.
47 N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 83-106.
48 Id. at 137-89. During this period, numerous legal challenges were brought to
halt the building of Dodger Stadium. At the core of these challenges was the argument
which Robert Moses had raised in New York, namely, that the government could not
turn public land over to a private baseball club for the erection of a private stadium.
When this issue finally reached the California Supreme Court, the court held that a public purpose was present. See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of the County of Los
Angeles, 51 Cal.2d 423, 333 P.2d 745 (1959). As part of the contract with Los Angeles
under which it obtained Chavez Ravine, the Dodgers agreed to convert a portion of the
land into public recreational facilities and maintain them as such for at least twenty
years. In addition, the Dodgers agreed to turn over to the city a minor league ballpark
which the team had acquired while it was still in Brooklyn. Taken together, the land and
the minor league ballpark were enough to convince the court that Los Angeles met the
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Dodgers moved into the private Dodger Stadium, and have played
49
there ever since.
CONCLUSION

Today, sports team owners expect to have their stadiums paid
for through public funds,5 0 and it is quite rare for them to use their
own funds to build a new stadium. 5 ' Thus, Walter O'Malley's strugpublic purpose requirement. N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 173. Professor Sullivan reproduces a copy of the agreement between the Dodgers and the City of Los Angeles
towards the end of his book. Id. at 220-27. In the years that followed, numerous other
courts confronted the same issue that had faced the California Supreme Court. All employed similar reasoning to find that the municipal action was proper. See, e.g., Ginsberg
v. City & County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685 (1968); New Jersey Sports &
Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 292 A.2d 580 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1971); Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 906 (1966); Martin v. City of
Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894 (1966).
49 N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 190-211.
50 Id. at 213-15. See generally Wilkerson, What Taxpayers and Their Teams Dofor Each
Other, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1988, at E26, col. I (nat'l ed.). See also supra note 2. But see
Jersey Officials See Defeat on Stadium Bond Issue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1987, at 12, col. 1 (nat'l
ed.) (reporting on the failure of a $185 million bond issue designed to lure a professional baseball team to the Meadowlands). Without a doubt, however, the master of
stadium shopping is Al Davis, the owner of the National Football League Raiders. Davis
has raised shopping for stadium concessions and improvements from local municipalities to an art form. After he became dissatisfied with the Oakland Coliseum, he moved
his team to Los Angeles in the early 1980's. This move led to the filing of numerous
lawsuits. See Koppett, Raider Colors Match Judges' Robes, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1988, at 49,
col. 1; see also Comment, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders: Defining the Parametersof Limitless Power, 1983 UTAH L. REv. 397; Comment, Taking the Oakland Raiders: A Theoretical
Reconsiderationof the Concepts of Public Use andJustCompensation, 32 EMORY L.J. 857 (1983);
Note, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oakland Raiders and Poletown?, 20
CAL. W.L. REV. 82 (1983); Note, Eminent Domain Exercise-StareDecisis or a Warning: City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 4 PACE L. REV. 169 (1983); Note, Eminent Domain and the Commerce Clause Defense: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1184 (1987).
When Irwindale, a nearby suburb, subsequently made a better offer in August 1987,
Davis announced that he again would move the team. See Cummings, From Rocks to
Riches: Tiny Suburb That Landed a Pro Team, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1987, at 6, col. 1. Since
then, however, Irwindale has expressed doubt over its ability to finance the promised
stadium. See Raider Stadium Facing Problems, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1988, at 32, col. 1.
Davis, however, already has received a non-refundable advance of $10 million from
Irwindale. RaiderMove is Set Back, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at 50, col. 1. Moreover,
there have been reports that Davis has been negotiating with Oakland officials to return
the team to the Oakland Coliseum. See Heisler & Reich, Oakland Says it Awaits RaidersIrwindale Failure, L.A. Times, May 19, 1989, pt. 2, at 3, col. 1.
51
A notable exception is Joe Robbie, the owner of the National Football League
Miami Dolphins. Turning his back on Miami after years of pleading with it to repair the
aging, decaying Orange Bowl, Robbie built a new stadium by raising more than $100
million in private funds. In doing so, however, Robbie encountered problems similar to
those faced by O'Malley:
On March 5, 1984, he announced plans to build a stadium in time for the
1987 season, when he would no longer be bound by his Orange Bowl
lease. He said that after 1986, the Dolphins would never play another
game in the city-owned stadium, which was built in 1937 by the Works
Project Administration.
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gle to build a new stadium using his own money is in many ways now
nothing more than a quaint idea of a bygone era. Nevertheless,
there is an important lesson for lawyers to learn in the decision of
the Brooklyn Dodgers to move West. Had the bar challenged Robert Moses' reading of the Housing Act of 1949, or had Peter Brown
made his alternative suggestion sooner, the Dodgers probably
would still be playing in Brooklyn. The fact that they are not is liv52
ing testimony to a collective failure not of law, but of lawyers.

..Robbie had to hock the Dolphins, right down to their last jersey and
pair of cleats, to keep construction going .....
Robbie leases the property from Dade County for $1 a year on a 99-year
lease. The site was donated to the county by the property owners, Lawrence and Emil Morton of Miami, with an understanding that it would be
used as a stadium site. The Mortons still own 270 acres adjacent to the
stadium and plan to develop the land with hotels, restaurants, offices,
shops and condominiums.
The plan did not please everyone, however. As was Walter O'Malley's
takeover of Chavez Ravine for the Dodgers in 1958, Robbie's was met
with resistance by residents of neighboring tracts.
Glick, Miracle of Miami: They Said Joe Robbie Could Not Do It, But his Stadium is Proof he
Could-and Did, L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 1987, pt. 3, at 3, col. 2.
52
Following the defection of the Dodgers, the New York bar, led by William A.
Shea, a partner in a Manhatten law firm, redeemed itself to an extent by persuading the
National League to award New York City an expansion team. Dubbed the New York
Mets, the team quickly was installed in a city-built stadium in Flushing Meadows named
Shea Stadium. N. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 119.

